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Introduction
No one can deny that the rise of the emerging economies represented by
China has brought a huge impact to the post-Cold War international order. We
can see the impact not only in the realm of geopolitics or trade, but also in
development cooperation.
Emerging economies represented by China have increased development
cooperation since the early 2000s, and that has brought confrontation between
donors. While western donors emphasise ethical values in their aid, China takes
gaining mutual benefit through development cooperation for granted. On the
other hand, although the West often make use of their aid as a kind of leverage
to engage in the recipients’ politico-economic reform to appeal to the universal
norm, China respects the principle of non-interference and provides aid
accordant with the recipients’ requests. Their dispute is especially fierce in
Africa, back-grounded by their economic or strategic interests. 
As regards the confrontation between western donors and China, Japan’s
position is quite unique. Although Japan is a member of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC), its development cooperation is not necessarily
similar to western donors’. Rather, there are some commonalities with China’s,
and the DAC often pointed out the characteristics. However, Japan has
accelerated its approach since the early 2000s. What made it take the reaction?
Will Japan separate itself from the western donors’ community? And, what are
the implications in terms of the confrontation over development cooperation?
From these questions, we will consider the shift and individuality of Japan’s
横浜市立大学論叢社会科学系列　2015；Vol.66　№ 1
78
development cooperation. First, we will begin by confirming the dispute over
development cooperation between the West and emerging donors, especially
China. Second, we will examine the history of the transition and continuity of
Japan’s development cooperation. Third, we will consider current characteristics
of Japan’s aid in Africa in terms of the relations with western donors and China.
Finally, we will argue the meaning of Japan’s approach in terms of international
politics over development cooperation in Africa.
1. Dispute over development cooperation
1-1 Standardised trend of development cooperation
Prior to considering emerging donors, we will briefly examine standardised
trends of development cooperation to make their characteristics clear. One may
say that the formal starting point of development cooperation was ‘point four’
of President Harry S. Truman’s inaugural speech (1949), and the Marshall Plan
(1948) was the plot type of aid in the early days. Western countries led by the
US had propelled developing infrastructure in developing countries with huge
capital from the end of 1940s to the end of 1970s, under the influence of the
Modernisation Theory. The ‘big-push approach’ was represented by the UN
Development Decade Program initiated by President John F. Kennedy in 1961.
However, after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) by the IMF and the World Bank, or the Bretton-Woods Institutions
(BWIs), in the 1980s, western donors began to use loans to engage in the
decision-making of the recipient governments. The BWIs compelled the
recipients in Latin America and Africa, which suffered from huge foreign debt
caused by the Oil Crisis in 1973, to implement economic reforms through the
SAPs based on Neo-liberalism, and ‘political conditionality’ like good
governance was also added to the conditions of loans after the end of the Cold
War. Yet, except for some exceptions like the ‘IMF’s star pupil’ Ghana,
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unilateral SAPs did not necessary bring the reduction of budget deficit and the
economic growth to the recipients, but seemed to have brought serious impacts
to the poor. Hence it is no wonder that the SAPs were criticised not only by the
recipients, but also certain donors, like UNICEF1. 
Faced with the criticisms and activation of movement for debt relief
represented by the Jubilee 2000, western donors including the BWIs turned their
policy toward poverty reduction in the mid-1990s. We shall roughly sketch the
characteristics of poverty reduction from three views; debt relief, basic social
service (BSS) as the main purpose of aid, and collective commitment. 
First, debt relief was the starting point of poverty reduction. The BWIs
introduced the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative to cancel the
debt of the HIPCs in 1996, and expanded the objective in 1999. These are
schemes for the HIPCs to make use of money which has been cancelled for
repayment for pro-poor development. It is necessary for the recipients to make
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which includes the report of
the state of development and the plan for the improvement, by themselves. In
parallel with this, grants were standardised as aid for low-income countries.
Second, western donors began to give priority to BSS, like primary education
or public health, in their aid. In 1996, the same year as the introduction of the
HIPCs initiative, the DAC emphasised focus on BSS as the main purpose of
ODA in its report, Shaping the 21st Century2. There is no need to add at this
time that this trend is hugely based on Amartya Sen’s concept of ‘capability’.
As a result, achieving individuals’ freedom of choice is set as the fundamental
1 UNICEF criticised the SAP, and required ‘adjustment with a human face’. See; UNICEF, 1987,
UNICEF Annual Report 1987
(http://www.unicef.org/about/history/files/unicef_annual_report_1987.pdf). 
2 DAC, 1996, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation,
OECD: Paris (http://www.oecd.org/dac/2508761.pdf).
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goal of development3. From this perspective, it is no wonder that BSS
organising the environment in which individuals can get along by their own will
prioritised infrastructure or industrial assistance in development cooperation. In
that sense, one may say that current western donors focus on an ethical norm in
their development cooperation, even if the importance of economic growth is
not ignored.
Third, and finally, western donors established new modes for providing aid:
the Sector Wide Approaches for consulting with the recipient governments to
implement sector reform, like education policy, and aid coordination among
donors. In other words, western donors began to collectively commit to the
recipient governments’ decision-making to achieve poverty reduction as the
‘common goal’, and that was justified in terms of effectiveness of aid4. That has
not been officially systematised in the DAC yet, and in most cases, donors
being interested in any particular recipients ad hoc compose like-minded donor
groups (LMDGs). LMDGs, which are often led by the UK, generally share
common pooled funds, and consult with the recipient governments over sector
reform including fiscal policy5.
Although poverty reduction with these three characteristics was originally
from western donors, it was followed by the adoption of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) at the General Assembly of the United Nations in
2000. That meant that the global ‘poverty reduction regime’ was established,
3 Amartya K. Sen, 1981, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, New
York: Oxford University Press; 1999, Development as Freedom, New York, Oxford University
Press.
4 In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, which is to consolidate aid coordination,
five principles were emphasised for aid effectiveness; ownership, alignment, harmonisation,
result, and mutual responsibility. See; OECD, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the
Accra Agenda for Action (http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf).
5 In the case of the Program Aid Partners in Mozambique, fourteen DAC members and fifteen
international organisations are involved in 2014 (http://www.pap.org.mz/eng/index.php/en/about-
us/2014-04-15-12-29-36/international-organizations).
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and that poverty reduction became a ‘common mission’ of donors and
recipients. The regime was consolidated by the publication of the DAC
Guidelines: Poverty Reduction in 2001. However, it must be noted that low-
income countries had little choice but to follow the international community’s
trend6.
1-2 Characteristics of emerging donors’ development cooperation
Turning now to emerging donors, it is hard to grasp their performance
comprehensively because of their low transparency, but they have gradually and
partly presented it. Table 1 shows aid performance of main DAC members and
emerging donors in 2009. Compared with the former’s volume, the latter’s was
not necessarily numerous. Yet, regarding the pace of their growth, it seems
reasonable to suppose that some emerging donors may catch up with the main
western donors in the near future. 
Either way, all emerging donors do not necessary share the same
characteristics. In general, ‘emerging donors’ include Brazil, China, India,
Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and so on, although some of them have
long history as donors, like China from the 1950s. According to Myriam Saidi
 
6 On the recipients’ dissatisfaction against unilateral application of poverty reduction, for
example, see; Bartholomew Amah, 2008, “From SAPs to PRSPs: A Tale of Two Paradigms or
Simply a Tale?,” in Joe Amoako-Tuffour and Bartholomew Armah eds., Poverty Reduction
Strategies in Action: Perspectives and Lessons from Ghana, Lanham: Lexington Books, pp.73-91.
7  Myriam Dahman Saidi and Christina Wolf, 2011, Recalibrating Development Co-operation:
How Can African Countries Benefit from Emerging Partners? (OECD Development Centre
Working Paper), (302), Paris: OECD, p.8.
8 Debora Brautigam, 2008, “China’s Foreign Aid to Africa: What Do We Know?,” in Robert I.
Rotberg, ed., China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, pp.197-216.
9 African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,
2011, African Economic Outlook 2011, Paris: OECD, p.16
(http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/ Media_
Embargoed_Content/ EN-AEO_2011_embargo%206%20Juin.pdf).
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and Christina Wolf, it is possible to distinguish Asian donors and the others
including Brazil and the Middle Eastern countries by their means and
motivation; while the former tends to use various types of capital based on their
economic self-interests, the latter makes much of grants7. 
To discuss emerging donors or Asian donors as a whole is beyond the scope
of a brief paper. We shall concentrate on China as one of the representative
Asian donors, and on its Africa approach as one of the subjects of world-wide
controversy. Let us roughly confirm the characteristics or the differences from
western donors accordant with two points presented in the OECD’s report.
First, China’s development cooperation is not usually based on grants, but on
providing capital. China has three types of aid; grants, zero-interest loans, and
low-interest ‘concessional’ loans with subsidised interest rates8. In addition, it
generally uses export credits for both sides, buyers and sellers, on a large scale,
and resource-backed lines of credits, which are schemes for the finance of
infrastructures repaying the loans through resource exports. China’s financial
flow to Africa between 2007 and 2009 is estimated to be about US$7.1 billion
in total, which is more than the estimation of its total aid qualified with the
DAC’s criteria of ODA in the same period, which is US$1.9 billion9. The
means using capital in various ways contrasted with western donors’ aid after
the mid-1990s, making much of grants as aid for low-income countries.
10 China Information Office of the State Council, 2011, China’s Foreign Aid
(http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913.htm).
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Second, China’s development cooperation is heavily composed of the
development of infrastructures and agriculture, unlike western donors that focus
on BSS. According to the government of China (GOC), by the end of 2009,
61% of concessional loans were used to construct transportation,
communications and electricity infrastructure in developing countries10. Table 2
shows China’s commitment pledged at  each conference of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since 2000. We can see that most of China’s aid
to Africa has been composed of infrastructure, although the proportion is
different by time. In addition, it must be noted that Beijing focuses on project-
based aid, and this is also different from the international community’s trend,
which makes much of the Sector-Wide Approaches. 
In addition to these two, although this is a point which is briefly mentioned by
Saidi and Wolf, it is important to note that Beijing is not actively commit to the
recipients internal affairs. As mentioned above, western donors have often used
aid as a leverage for particular purposes like protection of human rights,
democratisation, good governance, and so on, since the end of the Cold War.
Moreover, it is hard to deny that western donors established even the trend of
poverty reduction outside of the recipients. On the contrary, Beijing seldom
even makes a comment about the recipients’ internal affairs, and does not
explicitly require them to implement any development strategies. It will be
useful to keep these points in mind as we examine the disputes over aid between
western donors and China. 
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1-3 Criticism against China
As emerging donors’ presence grew larger in developing countries, concerns
against it appeared in the West in the mid-2000s. On 7 December 2006, Adnan
Mazarei, a director of the IMF, warned African countries “to avoid another
round of debt accumulation” caused by numerous loans by emerging donors, in
the Financial Times11. This was followed by Moisés Naím’s column in the New
York Times on 15 February 2007, “Help Not Wanted”. In this article, Naím
pointed out that emerging donors undermined development policy of the
recipient and western donors through providing unnecessary projects without
bids or conditions in order to gain their own benefits, and he named that ‘rogue
aid’12. Both of them mainly argued about China, and these triggered fierce
criticism against it.
This wave was back-grounded by the Darfur conflict. In western Sudan,
Janjaweed, Arab militia, began to attack and occupy villages in 2003. It was
said that Janjaweed was supported by President Omar Al-Bashir, and the
International Criminal Court issued the first warrant of arrest for him on charges
of genocide and crimes against humanity on 4 March 2009. However, while the
US, which had appointed Sudan as one of the ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ since
1993, insisted on the introduction of sanctions against the government of Sudan
at the Security Council, China and Russia opposed full-scale sanctions based on
the logic of ‘non-interference’. On the other hand, since the late 1990s China
had been the biggest investor in Sudan, the sixth-ranked oil-producing country
within Africa at that time. It follows from what has been said that the Darfur
conflict was the critical turning point for China’s image; ‘a state pursuing
85
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Times, December 7, 2006 (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/640a5986-863a-11db-86d5-
0000779e2340.html#axzz39JnY3Y7v). 
12 Moisés Naím, “Help Not Wanted,” New York Times, February 7, 2007
(http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/opinion/15naim.html?_r=1&).
economic interests without caring of human rights.’ As a result, China has been
much more criticised by the West than the other emerging donors or Asian
donors. 
Let me examine the criticisms accordant with three points which we
considered in the last subsection; various capital flow, building infrastructure,
and passiveness to commit the recipients’ internal affairs. 
First, the commitment with various capitals has been a point in question, since
that makes the distinction between aid and economic activities vague13. In
particular, as Mazarei pointed out, considering that western donors have
implemented debt relief of low-income countries since the introduction of the
HIPCs initiative, it is no wonder that they have concerns about the danger of the
loans raising the debt burden of low-income countries again. Moreover, it is no
doubt that the huge capital flow from China is one of factors accelerating the
relaxation of resource-rich recipients’ fiscal control.
Second, viewed from the standardised ethical standpoint, poverty reduction,
which focuses on BSS, numerous development cooperation inclined toward
infrastructures seems a ‘deviation’ to begin with, regardless of their usefulness
or not. In addition, building big infrastructures tends to depend on loans.
Moreover, in most cases, Chinese companies exclusively accept orders of the
projects, and the recipient governments have to purchase at least half of the
necessary goods for the construction from China in accordance with the
contracts14. Therefore China’s aid to Africa has contributed to the increase of
the former’s exports to the latter. Hence, it is no wonder that China’s
development cooperation has been criticised for seeking its own economic
86
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13 Arjan de Haan, 2011, “Will China Change International Development as We Know It?”
Journal of International Development, 23, pp.881–908; Kristian Kjøllesdal and Anne Welle-
Strand, 2010, “Foreign Aid Strategies: China Taking Over?” Asian Social Science, 6(10), pp.3-13.
14 May Tan-Mullins, Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, 2010, “Redeﬁning ‘Aid’ in the China-
Africa Context,” Development and Change, 41(5), pp857-881.
interests.
Finally, China’s passiveness to engage in the recipients’ internal affairs has
often been condemned by the West, because it substantially ignores serious
human rights abuse like the Darfur conflict, and enables authoritarian rulers to
survive politically. China has invited the delegations not only from Sudan but
also from Eritrea and Zimbabwe to the FOCAC, while some western countries
have made sanctions to the three countries mainly due to their poor conditions
of human rights. As a result, the FOCAC is often regarded as a representative
part of the ‘Beijing Consensus’, a China-centred network composed of
authoritarian regimes embracing state-capitalism, by western critics15 .
1-4 Objections and adjustments by China
The spread of criticism arose over a dispute between western donors and
China on development cooperation16. As a reaction against criticisms, the GOC
issued China’s Foreign Aid in 2011, and explicated China’s principles including
five basic feature of development cooperation: (1) unremittingly helping
recipient countries build up their self-development capacity; (2) imposing no
political conditions; (3) adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common
development; (4) remaining realistic while striving for the best; and (5)
keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and innovation17.
Out of these, the third point is especially noteworthy in examining China’s
response to the first and second criticism, as mentioned above. 
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the Twenty-First Century, New York:Basic Books. On the other hand, Mckinnon pointed out the
similarity to the Washington Consensus. Ronald I. McKinnon, 2010, “China in Africa: The
Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus,” International Finance, 13(3), pp.495-506.
16 On further details of China’s objections, for example, see; Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power,
2010, op.cit.; Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Huangao Shi, 2009, “China’s African Policy in the Post-
Cold War Era,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 39(1), pp.87-115.
17 China Information Office of the State Council, 2011, op.cit .
Appealing equality, mutual benefit and common development, Beijing
emphasises that China is one of the developing countries. That implies a double
meaning: (1) China is not a member of the DAC, and does not have an
obligation to obey the poverty reduction guideline making much of BSS, grant,
aid coordination, and so on; (2) gaining benefit through development
cooperation is natural for developing countries, unlike developed countries. In
addition, emphasising equality, Beijing insists that it does not coerce anything,
and that development of infrastructure is based on the request from the
recipients. In fact, China’s aid is mainly composed of request-base projects18.
At the same time, one may say that this principle implies a criticism that
western donors’ aid does not necessarily cover the low-income countries’ needs.
On the other hand, on the matter of human rights, we should not overlook the
second point, imposing no political conditions. The GOC has been promoting
the principle of ‘non-interference’ among sovereign states, according to
traditional South-South cooperation since the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence in 1954. This turns to a criticism against the West attaching
conditionality to aid, and it is no wonder that this diplomatic policy is generally
supported by developing countries, in particular African countries which have
an experience to be constantly ‘preached’ to by the West. In fact, declarations or
action plans including the opposition against ‘political use of human rights’ or
‘double standard’ have been adopted at each conference of the FOCAC, even if
the tone is different by time19. 
It follows from what has been said that Beijing presents a different view from
the West’s standardised concept over development cooperation. However, while
the GOC has not hesitated to have a fierce dispute with the West, it has adjusted
88
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18 Kobayashi Takaaki, 2008, “Evolution of China’s Aid Policy,” JBICI Working Paper (21),
Tokyo: Japan Bank for International Cooperation (http://jica-ri.jica.go.jp/IFIC_and_JBICI-
Studies/jica-ri/english/publication/archives/jbic/report/working/pdf/wp27_e.pdf).
19 Each document is accessible at the website of the FOCAC (http://www.focac.org/eng/).
its approach in Africa. As Table 2 shows, China’s commitment to development
in Africa has rapidly increased since FOCAC III, and has gradually widened
with its range, not only in trade and investment, but also in clean energy,
financial services for the poor, technology transfer, and so on. In addition,
numerous debt has been cancelled, providing new loans. Moreover, although it
was not explicated in the documents of the FOCAC, the GOC increased its
contribution to the UN missions for peace-keeping operations in Africa, and the
numbers of troops overtook the USs’ by 200820.
Considering that international criticism against China’s approach began to
spread in the mid-2000s, it is entirely fair to say that western criticism became a
momentum of Beijing’s adjustment. However, we should notice that Beijing’s
reaction was not only against western donors, but also against the recipients,
because the friction between Chinese companies and local people became
apparent in a lot of countries in the mid-2000s. For example, in August 2005,
Ghana’s Chamber of Commerce required the delegation of China’s Ministry of
Commerce to adjust its huge export surplus21. In September 2006, the oil-
exploitation by the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation in Loango
National Park was stopped by the government of Gabon22. In May 2009, the
African Labour Research Network, which is composed of African union leaders
and educators, published a report on the problems of Chinese enterprises, like
payment under minimum wage23. When China justifies its advance to Africa
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20 David H. Shinn, 2008, “Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the
World,” in Rotberg ed., op.cit., pp.155-196.
21 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 42(7), July-Aug. 2005,
p.16612.
22 Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007, China’s Engagement of Africa: Preliminary Scoping of
African Case Studies, Cape Town: Centre for Chinese Studies, pp.94-95
(http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/rf_paper_final.pdf).
23 Anthony Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch, ed., 2009, Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour
Perspective, African Labour Research Network
(http://www.cebri.org/midia/documentos/315.pdf).
with the logic of ‘mutual benefit’ or ‘common development’, it is hard for the
former to ignore the latter’s complaint. From this view, it is no wonder that the
GOC shifted its gears in the mid-2000s.
In parallel with this, China began to communicate with western donors, and to
partly transmit information in the late-2000s. This was represented by the
establishment of a studying group for aid with the DAC (2009), the foundation
of a joint-meeting with African ecologist NGOs as a follow-up of the FOCAC
IV (2010), the publication of white papers like China’s Africa Policy (2006) or
China’s Foreign Aid (2011), which was mentioned above, and so on. It also
should be added that these events followed the rise of attention to ‘soft power’
in Beijing, and President Hu Jintao repeatedly urged Chinese businesses to
respect local laws during his visit to Africa eight months prior to his first
official mentioning about ‘soft power’ in October 200724.
In sum, one may say that China has gradually shifted its attitude to Africa
from ‘one of the developing countries’ to a ‘responsible state’ since the mid-
2000s. That is symbolised by the fact that Hu did not use the words of ‘South-
South cooperation’ in his keynote speech at the FOCAC V in 2012. However,
of course it is exaggerated to say that China’s approach will overlap with
western donors’ in the near future, because of the differences of diplomatic
standpoints that they have with each other. On the other hand, illegal activities
by Chinese companies or merchants have been often reported, even after
Beijing’s shift25. Therefore one may say that the GOC faces double challenges;
90
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24 Xinhua, 2007, “Hu Jintao calls for enhancing ‘soft power’ of Chinese culture,” 15 October
2007 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content_6883748.htm); Peter Bosshard,
2008, “China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa,” China in Africa Policy Briefing, (3),
Johannesburg: SAIIA 
(http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/234-china-africa-policy-brief-no-3-april-2008).
25 China Export-Import Bank has already requested a separate report about the potential
environmental impact of any company applying for funding since 2004. See; Li Anshan, Liu
Haifang, Pan Huaqiong, Zeng Aiping and He Wenping, 2012, “FOCAC Twelve Years Later:
justification of its standpoint to the West and Africa, and management of the
internal players.
2. Transition and continuity of Japan’s approach
2-1 Outlook of Japan’s aid
It was observed in the preceding section that China has risen as the biggest
emerging donor in Africa. Now that we are sure that there is a crevasse between
western donors and China, the next step is to consider the position of Japan, the
oldest Asian DAC member. As Brautigam succinctly pointed out, China’s
development cooperation is quite similar to Japan’s26. Based on the same
viewpoint, Saidi and Wolf observed that Asian donors, especially China,
‘recycled’ Japan’s way27. We will begin with a simple observation about
Japan’s aid in accordance with three points which were focused on earlier. 
First, let us confirm the kind of capital flow. Figure 1 shows the net and total
gross amount of each DAC member’s Official Development Assistance (ODA),
and the difference means inflow from the recipients’ repayment. We can see
that loans occupy a much higher proportion in Japan’s ODA than in the other
DAC members’. Figure 2 shows the DAC members’ Other Official Flows
(OOF), which is official but less advantageous for the recipients than ODA in
terms of the interest, and so on. It is obvious that Japan largely uses various
capital flows other than grants, unlike most of western donors.
Second, we explore the purpose of aid. Figure 3 shows the ratio of social and
administrative infrastructure in ODA, which is composed of education, health,
good governance, and so on, and Figure 4 indicates the ratio of economic
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Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward,” The Nordic Africa Institute Working Paper,
(74), p.41 (http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:538478/FULLTEXT01.pdf).
26 Deborah Brautigam, 2009, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, New York:
Oxford University Press.
27 Saidi and Wolf, 2011, op.cit, p.8. 
infrastructures. Compared with the other DAC members, Japan generally
focuses on economic infrastructures in its ODA. 
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28 The GOJ announced a plan to revise the second edition in March 2014.
29 The Government of Japan, 1992, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ref1.html); 2003, revised
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf).
 
 
Third, and finally, we have to inquire into the relation between aid and
recipients’ internal affairs. The government of Japan (GOJ) has twice published
the ODA Charter as the guideline for its aid, in 1992 and 200328. These charters
shared the same sentence in the preamble of its principle for providing ODA;
“ODA will be provided in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
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(especially sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic matters) as well
as the following points29.” We will consider the points later. What has to be
noticed is that the GOJ dared to emphasise the doctrine of respect for
sovereignty. In other words, Tokyo is generally passive in making use of ODA
for the engagement in the recipients’ internal affairs.
In sum, Japan’s development cooperation has some commonalities with
China’s. This tendency can be found in academic circles as well. It is not rare
that development economists, especially those belonging to major or
conservative schools in Japan, show scepticism against the current trend of
western donors. In one of the most-used textbooks on development cooperation
in Japan, Nishigaki et al argue “It is meaningless to adhere to the distinction
between social infrastructure and economic infrastructure, if we aim to realise
poverty reduction through smooth community development”, and “Aid
coordination by western donors’ communities lowers the recipients’ bargaining
power, and makes their freedom of choice small30.” 
One may say that this view is based on the belief that economic growth is the
pre-condition for improving people’s well-being, and that giving grants is not
necessarily good for the recipients because of the damaging effect it may have
on their ownership or dignity, and they should refrain from interfering with
sovereign states. Either way, it is certain that Japan’s aid includes hugely
different tendencies from the DAC’s standardised approach. 
2-2 Japan’s development cooperation in the Cold War era
These characteristics were more obvious in the early days of Japan’s aid, in
the mid-1950s. Figure 5 shows the distribution of regions in which the GOJ
provided ODA. Japan started its development cooperation as a form of
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30 Nishigaki Akira, Shimomura Yasutami and Tsuji Kazuto, 2009, Kaihatsu-Enjo no Keizai-
Gaku (the fourth edition), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, p.92, 252 (translated by Mutsuji).
compensation for World War II, and the first case was the Baruchan No.2
hydroelectric power plant in Burma, which was agreed upon in 195431.
Regarding this path, it was natural that its ODA was concentrated on East Asia,
including Southeast Asia, in those days. Besides, reflected by the inclination
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toward infrastructure, as Figure 6 shows, Japan’s early ODA was heavily
composed of loans. In addition, as a lot of scholars pointed out, Japanese
companies exclusively undertook the projects, and the recipients had to
purchase nearly half of their necessary goods from Japan.
However, Japan’s development cooperation has gradually shifted accordant
with changes in the international environment and its position since the 1970s.
The first turning point was to the Oil Crisis in 1973. The steep rise in price of
natural resources compelled Japan to diversify the supplying countries. As a
result, the GOJ began to widen the range of recipients for its aid, particularly in
South Asia and the Middle East in the late 1970s, as Figure 5 shows.
In addition, the GOJ faced another factor of the change in the mid-1970s;
bashing against Japan. In 1974, riots broke out in Bangkok and Jakarta during
the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. That represented the antipathy
against Japan’s economic over-presence in Southeast Asia, its main target of
trade and investment combined with aid. As a result, in 1977, Prime Minister
Fukuda Takeo presented his doctrine concerning relations with Southeast Asia
in Manila and the G7 Bonn Summit; remaining non-military power,
constructing heart-to-heart relations with ASEAN members, and equal
partnerships with ASEAN members. Along with the doctrine, Tokyo pledged to
provide ODA of US$1 billion to ASEAN.
Yet Japan faced its next bashing in the 1980s. As Japan became one of the
biggest donors, its approaches were criticised by the other DAC members on
some points; the low ratio of its grant element, the low ratio of its aid for the
Least Developing Countries, its tied loans, aid inclining toward infrastructures
rather than basic human needs, Japanese companies’ exclusive undertaking of
projects, and so on. That was back-grounded not only by Japan’s huge export
surplus to them, but also by the explicit dissatisfaction of the Reagan
administration against its insufficient ‘burden sharing’ in terms of security. 
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Faced with criticism from the Western camp, the GOJ gradually adjusted its
approach; the numbers of non-Japanese companies, which were allowed to bid
for Japan’s ODA projects, gradually increased through the 1980s, the Nakasone-
Reagan summit in 1985 agreed to implement bilateral consultation over
providing ODA, and so on32. In parallel with this, the GOJ began to appeal its
‘responsibility’ as a power; “For Japan, … its aid policy is considered to be
gaining wide support both at home and abroad as matching its national interests
and as one of the most effective means to contribute to the international
society33.” In other words, by the late 1980s, the GOJ began to make much of
aspects of ODA not only for mitigating frictions with other countries, but also
for rising its international prestige as a power through contributing to the
recipients’ economic prosperity and the reduction of international tensions34.
However, prior to the determination of evaluation on its adjustment, the GOJ
faced both overseas and internal criticism at the end of the 1980s over the
passiveness to engage in the recipients’ internal affairs. In those days, negative
aspects of Japan’s ODA were becoming known by the Japanese public because
of advocacy by liberal schools. Sumi accused that the natural environment or
ethnic minority’s livelihood was damaged by Japan’s ODA projects, which
were implemented under the low-transparent relationships with corrupt recipient
governments35. In parallel with this, Tokyo further came under fire
internationally because of the principle of ‘separation of politics from
economics (seikei bunri)’. In 1988, Japan, with Australia and New Zealand, was
condemned by almost all African countries at the UN General
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33 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988, Diplomatic Bluebook 1988
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34 Dennis T. Yasutomo, 1989, “Why Aid? Japan as an ‘Aid Great Power’,” Pacific Affairs, 62(4),
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35 Sumi Kazuo, 1989, ODA Enjo no Genjitsu, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten Publishers.
Assembly, because it continued to trade with South Africa under economic
sanctions by the UN due to the Apartheid regime. The huge condemnation made
Japan finally decide to retract ‘separation of politics from economics’, and
recognise the economic sanction. These international and internal criticisms
cultivated the soil of Japan’s shift in the 1990s.
2-3 Trial for adjustment in the 1990s
In 1990s, Tokyo endeavoured to transform its development cooperation, in
particular regarding the relationship between aid and recipients’ internal affairs.
That was back-grounded not only by 1988 UN General Assembly, but also by
the end of the Cold War in 1989. Faced with the collapse of the bipolar system,
the GOJ, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began to appeal the
necessity of the Security Council’s reform accordant with current contribution
to the UN, in order to make a new international order. In other words, the end of
the Cold War was a momentum which Japan tried to shift from being an
‘economic power’ to becoming a ‘politico-economic power.’ On the other hand,
almost all western donors stated that they would link their aid with human rights
or democracy in the recipient countries in 1990. This made the GOJ adjust its
development cooperation as its main diplomatic means.
Next, we shall concentrate on Japan’s ODA Charter that was adopted in 1992.
Within this, the GOJ basically adhered to the doctrine of respect for sovereignty
as the basic philosophy; “Japan attaches central importance to the support for
the self-help efforts of developing countries towards economic take-off ”.36 On
the other hand, the familiarity with the ‘universal values’ or the trend of the
international community was explicated, and the basic philosophy was followed
by four principles for providing aid: (1) pursuing environmental conservation
and development in tandem; (2) avoiding any use of ODA for military purposes;
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(3) paying full attention to trends in recipients’ military expenditures, their
development and production of mass destruction weapons, their export and
import of arms, etc.; (4) paying full attention to efforts for promoting
democratisation and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the
situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the
recipient country37. Out of these, especially the fourth point was almost same as
western donors’, and one may say that the GOJ emphasised to absorb the trend
of the international community.
However, it does not mean that the GOJ stood on same position as western
donors. In his panel data analysis based on the facts from 1986 to 2002, Furuoka
observed that there was no evidence that Japan employed its ODA as a leverage
to promote human rights38. In fact, Japan often did not freeze ODA for
recipients, especially with Asian countries that have close economic ties with it,
which western donors sanctioned against; Myanmar after the coup in 1988,
Indonesia after the Santa Cruz incident in 1991, Cambodia under military rule
in 1997, and so on. On the other hand, it was not unusual that Tokyo increased
ODA to its recipients when positive signs appeared in terms of the protection of
human rights. Regarding this, the GOJ emphasised that it did not apply its
standards automatically, instead made much of ‘friendly persuasion’ and ‘quiet
and patient diplomacy’39. Either way, to say the least, Tokyo was not
necessarily active to commit to the recipients’ internal affairs even after the
publication of the ODA Charter.
Moreover, the difference from western donors was clearer on the
development cooperation. Based on the fundamental persistence of its aid style,
99
MUTSUJI The Shift and Individuality of Japan’s Development Cooperation: A Joker in the New Scramble
36 The Government of Japan, 1992, op.cit.
37 ibid.
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a kind of ‘big push approach’, the GOJ often challenged the trend of western
donors’ communities, even if that tone was generally moderate. For example, in
1993, Tokyo supported the World Bank to publish the East Asian Miracle,
which surveyed the experience of economic growth in eight Asian countries
including Japan, and showed the role of the governments promoting a market
economy40. One may say that this was a trial to appeal an alternative
development model against Neo-Liberalism. Yet the East Asian Miracle
attracted little attention in western donors’ communities, although it was
generally and positively evaluated in Japanese academic or aid circles. It was
represented by the fact that the IMF applied the Neo-Liberal SAPs to Thailand
or South Korea after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997. Rather, the AFC
encouraged the arguments over ‘failure of Crony Capitalism’ in the West41.
Another challenge of Japan was against the introduction of the HIPCs
initiative, and it moderately but clearly opposed appealing the concern about
‘moral hazard’ of the recipients. However, faced with isolation in the DAC
influenced by western public opinion including the Vatican, the GOJ reluctantly
followed the trend of poverty reduction based on the HIPCs initiative42. As a
result, as we can see in Figure 6, the ratio of loans in Japan’s ODA rapidly
decreased after 1999 when the expanded HIPCs initiative was adopted by the
BWIs based on recognition by G8 summit. In short, the GOJ experienced a
‘sense of failure’ in the realm of development cooperation twice in the 1990s,
and that was a factor of Japan’s further adjustment in the 2000s.
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York: World Bank.
41 For example, see; Helen Hughes, 1999, “Crony Capitalism and the East Asian Currency and
Financial ‘Crises’,” Policy, 15(3), pp.3-9 (http://www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-magazine/
1999-spring/1999-15-3-helen-hughes.pdf).
2-4 Two signs in the 2000s
In the 2000s, two signs appeared in the GOJ’s development cooperation;
strengthening its traditional approach, and emphasising human security. Out of
these, the former became considerable, especially in the late 2000s. As Figure 7
shows, the ratio of economic infrastructure in the GOJ’s ODA began to increase
in 2008, although it had been decreasing since the late-1990s, when the global
poverty reduction regime was established43. In parallel with this, as we can see
in Figure 8, the volume of Japan’s OOF gradually increased in the late 2000s.
These were immediately caused by the World Financial Crisis, and had an
aspect as Japan’s commitment for preventing economic depression in
developing countries. On the other hand, we must not forget the international
plate-tectonics in the 2000s, and do need to be reminded of the path of the
GOJ’s development cooperation by the early 2000s. 
As Figure 9 shows, the DAC members, especially the US, rapidly began to
increase ODA in the early 2000s. That was caused not only by strengthening the
global poverty reduction regimes, but also by beginning the war on terrorism
and the spread of the recognition that, ‘poverty is the root cause of terrorism’. In
addition, we should notice that the appearance of emerging donors and the steep
rise of natural resources’ price fuelled this tendency. 
Within this environment, it is no wonder that there was a sense of impatience
in the GOJ; obeying the global poverty reduction regime seemed inconvenient
for Japan, especially because the trend of aid inclining toward BSS restricted its
comparative advantage of building infrastructures. The following, which is
presented in the revised ODA Charter in 2003, is understandable in this context;
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“Japan will utilize its own experience in economic and social development as
well as in economic cooperation when assisting the development of developing
countries, fully taking into account the development policies and assistance
needs of developing countries44.”
As mentioned above, Tokyo experienced a ‘sense of failure’ on development
cooperation twice in the 1990s; less attention to the East Asian Miracle, and the
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44 The Government of Japan, 2003, op.cit., p.2.
introduction of the HIPCs initiative. Meanwhile there was a ‘sense of success’
in Tokyo on its experience in Southeast Asia; the region, in which Japan had
focused on, finally became a centre of economic growth, and overtook the
average income of Sub Saharan Africa, in which European countries had been
the main donors45. One may say that the international plate tectonics in the
2000s exacerbated this complex, and that was fuelled by the global recession. 
However, that does not mean a recursion to simple ‘big-push approach’ based
on the trickle-down hypothesis. In the 2003 ODA Charter, while the GOJ
recognised the importance of BSS, it emphasised the necessity of sustainable
economic growth as the precondition of poverty reduction, and insisted on
compatibility of the both46. In short, Tokyo connected the international
community’s trend with its own tradition; poverty reduction and economic
growth. Besides, the connection is related to another sign in Japan in the 2000s;
emphasising human security.
Although the 2003 ODA Charter inherited four principles of ODA from the
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46 The Government of Japan, 2003, op.cit., p.3.
older version, they were placed behind the ‘basic policies’, which had not been
in the former version. The basic policies included five points: (1) supporting
self-help efforts of developing countries; (2) perspective of ‘human security’;
(3) assurance of fairness; (4) utilisation of Japan's experience and expertise; (5)
partnership and collaboration with the international community. Besides, it is
stated that “Japan will carry out ODA even more strategically, in accordance
with the … basic policies”47. It is hard to deny that emphasising its individual
view as the basic policies overshadowed the principles, including the respect of
‘universal values’ like human rights and democracy.
Either way, out of the basic policies, human security was the notion which
Tokyo had already paid attention to since the late 1990s48. In 1998, Prime
Minister Obuchi Keizo first mentioned human security during his visit to
Southeast Asia shortly after the AFC. Thereafter, Japan began to provide aid in
the name of human security like establishing the UN Trust Fund for Human
Security (1999), launching the Commission on Human Security (COHS)
(2001), and renaming the Grant Assistance for Grassroots, one of its ODA
items, to the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (2003),
and so on. 
According to the final report of the COHS co-chaired by Ogata Sadako,
former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amartya Sen, “Human
security naturally connects several kinds of freedom - such as freedom from want
and freedom from fear, as well as freedom to take action on one’s own behalf.
Ensuring human security expands ‘the real freedoms that people enjoy’.”49 What
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has to be noticed is that Tokyo focuses on ‘freedom from want’ rather than
‘freedom from fear’. In fact, most of the projects by the GOJ’s Grant Assistance
for Grassroots Human Security Projects are for improving the poor’s
livelihood50. 
On the other hand, the GOJ has kept away from the Human Security Network
(HSN), which was established in 1999 with an initiative of Canada and Norway
and has endorsed the discipline of ‘humanitarian intervention’ like the military
action by NATO in Kosovo or Serbia in 1999. Although they use same words,
human security, the standpoint of the HSN’s members are different from Japan
on the point that they make much of ‘freedom from fear.’ One may say that the
difference of the emphasis over human rights is reflected in the difference. Most
of the governments of Asian countries, including Japan, often and publicly
appeal the importance of economic, social and cultural rights rather than civil
and political rights51. In short, while the HSN tends to focus on human security
in terms of civil and political rights, the GOJ tends to focus on economic, social
and cultural rights. 
What has to be noticed is that the mainstream of Tokyo’s aid circle insists on
the fundamental consistency between human security, especially ‘freedom from
want’, and its traditional approach focuses on infrastructure. For example, in
2004, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) redefined
infrastructure as ‘a foundation of basic services, guaranteeing all people the
right to live in safety and good health and ultimately helping them realize their
dormant potentials by self-empowerment,’ and emphasised that infrastructure
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was a necessary element for pro-poor development52. At the same time,
‘infrastructure for people’ became the JICA’s slogan on the basis of recognising
problems of the earlier projects like infrastructure gap, environmental
destruction, and so on.
That could be called a kind of eclecticism. However, what should be noticed
is that Japan takes a course between the bottom-up approach, or the West’s
poverty reduction, and the trickle-down approach, or China’s ‘big-push’. On the
other hand, Tokyo never explicitly criticises the West’s interference with the
recipients’ internal affairs appealing civil and political rights, although it
emphasises human security in terms of economic, social and cultural rights.
Therefore one may say that in terms of the doctrine, Japan is in the crevice
between western donors and China in a double sense.
3. Japan in the New Scramble
3-1 A sketch of the New Scramble
Having observed the current dispute over development cooperation between
western donors and China or Asian donors, particularly in Africa, and noticing
Japan’s individuality as a donor, one can then go on to consider the GOJ’s
concrete commitment and the relations with the other two camps. The question
which we must consider next is Japan’s engagement in Africa. Yet before that is
considered, let us pause here to look briefly at contemporary relations between
Africa and the global powers.
As overseas economic interests rose, capital flow to Africa grew rapidly, and
the type of capital flow has changed. Figure 10 shows the DAC members’ ODA
to Africa. Regarding that most of them decreased aid to Africa after the end of
the Cold War, the change in the 2000s is considerable. On the other hand, as
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mentioned above, emerging donors have appeared as powerful aid providers in
Africa, although the details are unclear. In addition, as Figure 11 shows, what
has to be noticed is that the investment flow to Africa became more than aid in
the mid-2000s.
The current rush to Africa by global powers is called the New Scramble53.
While the former scramble was a competition between European countries to
colonise in the nineteenth century, the most eager players in the New Scramble
are the US and China, the largest traders with Africa especially imports. While
China increased its imports from Africa from US$3.2 billion in 2001 to
US$66.9 billion in 2012, the US increased its imports from US$19.7 billion to
US$61.2 billion54. In addition, the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI)
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from these to Africa has narrowed since the late 2000s. According to
Brautigam, while the US’s net FDI inflows to Africa increased from US$2.56
billion in 2005 to US$3.71 billion in 2012, China’s increased from US$0.39
billion to US$2.52 billion55.
In parallel with economic competition, the US and China stand in front of the
dispute over the approaches. In June 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton warned African governments and people to be cautious; “We saw that
during colonial times, it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off
leaders and leave. And when you leave, you don’t leave much behind for the
people who are there. We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa56.”
Against this statement, the GOC insisted that “There is a broad consensus
among African nations that China is not pursuing a neo-colonial strategy in
Africa”, and “China has also funded infrastructure and industrialization projects
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that the West has refused to fund since the days of colonialism. It is to be hoped
that these projects will finally help Africa modernize - a dream that seems
attainable for the first time since independence57.” 
However, while they confront each other diplomatically, the US and China
share some characteristics. They have legal frameworks to propel non-tariff
imports from African countries; the US established the African Growth
Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000, and China firstly explicated it at the FOCAC
II in 2003. Besides both of them promote ‘assisting Africa’s economic growth
through promoting trade’, but more than seventy percent of the two countries’
imports from Africa is fuel58. Nearly one may say that Washington and Beijing
tend to stress the differences between one another despite their commonality. 
This tangled rivalry is fuelled by the structure of the New Scramble. In the
former scramble, each power could exclusively grip the influence and wealth in
its segment. On the contrary, in the New Scramble, all foreign players can
approach almost all African countries under the rule of free trade, except for
special cases like the US and Zimbabwe, and so on. In short, the competition is
tougher and more complicated than that of the colonial days, because it is hard
for global powers to co-exist separately by demarcation. In that sense, one may
say that the situation under the Cold War was more similar to the colonial days’
rather than to todays’, at least for the foreign players.
Considering it from a different perspective, the current situation made African
governments recover their bargaining power against the West, in which they
have had a huge influence especially since the 1980s. In the open-door race, the
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relations with African governments have a critical meaning for foreign players,
particularly licencing to develop natural resources. In other words, the New
Scramble is a momentum for global powers to seek ‘friendly’ relations with
them. From this view, it is no wonder that the West tends to refrain from
condemning human rights abuse in resource-rich countries under pro-western
authoritarian regimes, like Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, and so on, and that resource-rich economies are prone to cause non-
transparent relations with foreign companies, regardless of their nationality59. 
On the other hand, the Arab Spring gave foreign players a lesson; they have
to pay attention to public opinion or local people’s reactions more than ever,
due to their influence based on the spread of democratic norms and information
tools. It is symbolised by anti-US sentiment in Egypt after Mubarak, and anti-
Chinese sentiment in Libya after Gaddafi. In other words, it is necessary for the
foreign players to avoid the situation in which they solely hold close relations
with the regimes, and to frequently and widely appeal their contribution or
usefulness not only for the governments in Africa, but also for the people, now
so more than ever. One can safely state that the New Scramble further promotes
all global powers’ interest in ‘soft power’ or ‘public diplomacy’.
Viewed in this light, the New Scramble includes competitions not only for
economic presence, but also for the discourse of ‘Africa’s friendship’. Besides,
it is hard to deny that aid is still a major means for getting favour in Africa, even
if it is not only one. Hence, one may say that Africa is an arena in which donors
confront each other and present their doctrines over development cooperation.
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2-2 Transition of the TICAD
As the New Scramble became fierce, the GOJ’s Africa policy began to shift
accordant with its general transition; strengthening its traditional approach, and
emphasising human security. Let us consider that by confirming each
conference of the TICAD. 
Unlike conferences like the French-Africa Summit or the Commonwealth
Summit hosted by the other DAC members, the TICAD has been pierced by the
ideals of ‘ownership and partnership’. As a result, the delegations of Eritrea,
Sudan and Zimbabwe, which have not been invited to the US’s AGOA Forum,
have smoothly attended each conference of the TICAD. In the case of the
Africa-EU summit in 2007, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown did not
attend the meeting, protesting the presence of President Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe60. On the contrary, the action plans of the FOCAC, which also
emphasise self-determination and equal partnership, almost always include
criticism against ‘political use of human rights’ by the West, based on the ideal
of ‘South-South cooperation’. Viewed in this light, one may say that the TICAD
is generally a non-political or pragmatic conference, except for its appeal on UN
reforms.
As confirmed in the last section, however, the liberal tone was comparatively
high in the GOJ’s doctrine over development cooperation in the 1990s. That
was reflected in the speeches or commitments which were presented at TICAD
in those days. Table 3 shows points of the main speeches at the conferences of
TICAD. For example, at TICAD I, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro
appreciated Africa’s effort for politico-economic reform, and Foreign Minister
Hata Tsutomu emphasised Japan’s will to contribute the process. One may say
that that represented the GOJ’s reaction to the trend after the end of the Cold War.
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On the other hand, at early TICADs, it was also apparent that Japan’s bilateral
aid and arrangements for economic exchange for its own benefit were generally
limited. Table 4 shows the commitments pledged by the GOJ at TICAD. We
can see that the GOJ emphasised multilateral approaches, like assisting Africa
through international organisations, or promoting South-South cooperation
between Africa and Southeast Asia at TICAD I or II. Considering that it was
shortly after the worldwide ‘Japan bashing’, it is no wonder that Japan’s attitude
was generally moderate at the early TICADs.
However, the GOJ showed a subtle but not negligible shift at TICAD III in
2003. In TICAD’s Tenth Anniversary Declaration, the GOJ followed the
international community’s trend by cancelling the debt of US$3 billion held by
African HIPCs. In addition, the multilateral approaches were also emphasised,
e.g. the Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference in cooperate with the
World Bank. On the other hand, ODA for developing infrastructures and
financial support for Japanese firms to invest in Africa were explicated in the
commitment of TICAD for the first time. 
The shift appeared not only in the commitment, but also in the keynote speech
by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. In the ‘three pillars’ of Japan’s
assistance, he mentioned ‘poverty reduction through economic growth’, and
substantially appealed the difference from the West. Besides, Koizumi
emphasised “Japan can contribute to ‘human security’.” It may be worth
pointing out, that the words ‘human rights’, which had been mentioned in the
Tokyo Declaration on African Development in 1993 twice and the Tokyo
Agenda for Action in 1998 thrice, were not used in TICAD’s Tenth Anniversary
Declaration at all. In short, TICAD III was the turning point accordant with the
general shift of the GOJ’s development cooperation, which was represented by
the revision of the ODA Charter in 2003.
The shift was accelerated at TICAD IV in 2008, especially in the aspect of
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strengthening its traditional approach. Compared with the previous conferences,
Japan’s commitment rapidly increased at TICAD IV. US$4 billion were
pledged as ODA for infrastructures and agriculture, and in particular, the
development of the One Stop Border Post (OSBP) system, regional roads
network, was emphasised. Besides, financial support for Japanese firms to
double investment for Africa was pledged up to US$2.5 billion. On the other
hand, assistance for social development was also increased, and the target
amount of aid was set for projects like building 1,000 schools with
approximately 5,500 classrooms, training 100,000 teachers in math and science,
and improving the management of 10,000 schools through local participation.
One may say that Tokyo presented its full-scale approach at TICAD IV.
The GOJ further geared up at TICAD V in 2012, and promised to provide
US$32 billion including ODA of US$14 billion. What should be noticed is not
only that they pledged to provide US$6.5 billion as ODA and the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation’s loan for building infrastructures, but also that
they increased other types of capital including private investment. That was
represented by US$2 billion for trade and investment insurance by the Nippon
Export and Investment Insurance, or US$2 billion for public finance by the
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, one of 102 Independent
Administrative Institutions (Dokuritsu Gyosei Hohjin), or semi-private
organizations receiving fiscal support from the government61.
On the other hand, the tone of emphasising human security has not
necessarily been high, although it has been kept since TICAD III. As Table 3
shows, TICAD IV and V shared a commonality; economic growth was located
at the first point of each of their three sub-themes, which was presented at the
keynote speeches. Moreover, we can see that human security was dealt with as
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the concept complementing economic growth in the keynote speeches (By way
of contrast, in the declarations and action plans which were adopted at TICAD
IV and V, the words of human rights were used only one time in the Yokohama
Declaration 2013). In sum, out of the two characteristics, strengthening its
traditional approach has become clearer, emphasising human security, in
TICAD. As a result, the non-political hue has been gradually stressed since
TICAD III.
As mentioned above, the shift is accordant with the shift of Japan’s general
shift over development cooperation in the 2000s. However, in addition to that,
we must not forget three additional factors. First, one may say that the failure of
the trial for the UN reform, partly caused by African countries passiveness in
2005, made Tokyo decide to gear up. Second, as with all countries, Japan is also
not far apart from economic interests in Africa. Third, and finally, we should
notice that the ‘China factor’ also promoted that. Out of these, when I speak of
the China factor, I do not wish to imply that Japan stands on the same position
with western donors represented by the US.
As Hughes pointed out, the rise of China made the ‘revisionist’ faction in
Tokyo, which is more politically nationalistic and economically liberal than the
post-War ‘pragmatic’ mainstream, accept China as a threat, and try to contain it
globally62. From this view, he described TICAD as a part of the chain
containing China. But the matter is not quite as simple as Hughes suggests.
Indeed the revisionists have tried to contain China globally, and have often
criticised it in Africa63. However, what should be noticed is that Tokyo has
made use of Beijing’s influence for justifying Japan’s development cooperation
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and securing its position in the DAC. In the following subsection, we shall look
more carefully into the triangular relationship in Africa between China, western
donors, and Japan.
3-3 Heterodoxy, or Joker?
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that Japan’s approach has further
‘deviated’ from the DAC’s standard especially since the early 2000s. However,
the reactions of western donors are different from those in the 1980s, and they
are generally permissive to Tokyo. 
In the Peer Review 2010, the DAC exhibited a suspicion over the
combination Japan’s traditional approach with human security; “JICA is trying
to add a human security dimension to all of its work, from the smallest to the
grandest project. But moving from policy to practice can be particularly
challenging for larger projects, such as major economic infrastructure64.”
Moreover, the DAC pointed out the ambiguity of Japan’s practice over gender-
related issue65. On the other hand, its hybrid approach was evaluated as being
generally positive; “Japan emphasises economic growth and focuses on major
infrastructure projects. The addition of the ‘human security’ perspective has
helped to promote a poverty dimension within an otherwise growth-orientated
outlook. This has helped Japan to reflect better the MDGs and pro-poor growth
in its approach66. ”
Western donors’ moderate reaction is back-grounded not only by Japan’s
adjustment, but also by their caution against emerging donors, especially China.
As emerging donors expanded their presence in developing countries, especially
African countries, some observations aimed at adjusting the existing approaches
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appeared in the West. At the first Africa-EU summit in 2007, Portugal’s
minister said that Europeans had been ‘excessively simplistic’ in insisting on
European models of government for Africa67. In 2009, Jennifer Cooke of the
Center of Strategic and International Studies explored China’s engagement in
Africa, and recommended the US Congress to increase aid for building
infrastructures in order to create a balance68. Moreover, although pursuing
donors’ own benefits used to be recused among the West, in the 2000s they
began to appeal ‘win-win’ relations with Africa, similar with emerging donors’
‘equality and mutual benefit’. For example, the Africa-EU summit has been
pierced by the principle of equal partnership69. It seems reasonable to suppose
that there is some impatience among western donors against the advancement of
China. 
This impatience is based not only on the influence of the inter-governmental
network centred by China, the so called ‘Beijing Consensus’, but also on
African people’s acceptance of China. According to the Pew Research Centre’s
report in 2013, there were not huge differences between the US and China in
terms of the favour from African people; while the average ratio of favour to the
former in Africa was 77%, the latter’s was 72%70. China’s score in Africa is
generally higher than that in the other regions. That is no wonder because, as
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Moyo acutely pointed out, China’s big-push approach, regardless of whether it
was more or less, contributed African countries’ rapid economic growth in the
2000s, in contrast to the period until the late 1990s when western countries’ aid
had had exclusive influence71. Indeed there is a lot of negative news over
Chinese companies’ activities in Africa, but that does not necessarily mean that
the West is much more favoured on the continent. 
As a result, as mentioned above, there are some signs to reconsider their
approaches in western donors. However, it is hard for them to justify the
adjustment of their approaches, especially over human rights, because that can
undermine their ‘soft power’, even if their ‘double standard’ and ‘political
conditionality’ have been criticised by the recipients. Namely, western donors
face a trade-off, and that makes them substantially allow Japan’s ‘deviation’.
Although Japan’s ideal or means is quite different from the West, it is finally
their colleague in terms of international politics, and, unlike China, is never
opposed to their stance emphasising civil and political rights. In other words,
thanks to China’s predominant rush, Japan has been able to strengthen its
traditional approach without facing huge criticism from the West as a result. 
Within this environment, there are even cases in which western donors
cooperate with the GOJ’s project. The OSBP programme which started in
Chirundu, on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe, is a typical example.
The OSBP is aimed at speeding up border-crossing procedures by making
export and import operational procedures simultaneous, and the projects
generally aim to provide legal assistance, capacity building for trade procedure,
infrastructure, and so on. Following the construction of a border bridge with a
grant of about US$15 million in 2002, JICA agreed with both governments to
build necessary equipment and provide technical cooperation in 2007. As a
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result, Chirundu’s post began to operate as the first OSBP on the continent in
2009. In parallel with this, OSBP has been emphasised as one of main targets
since TICAD IV, and JICA has successively propelled other projects in
Africa72.
What should be noticed is that JICA took the initiative to provide the project
with the cooperation of the UK Department for International Development
(DFID), particularly in capacity building, in Chirundu73. Although the UK has
implemented economic sanctions against the Mugabe administration, it is a
general custom that political relations do not necessarily apply to humanitarian
aid. However, it is doubtful that the OSBP inclusion of construction of
infrastructure corresponds with humanitarian aid in the sight of the UK, even if
the DFID was not responsible. In other words, it is entirely fair to suppose that
the UK made use of the OSBP project at Chirundu as an opportunity to
accomplish two things; to keep relations with its former colony, and to build
infrastructures in Africa. 
Similarly, US Aid for International Development or the World Bank also
participated in some OSBP projects in which JICA undertook the position of a
leading donor74. As a result, they are generally quiet over JICA’s ODA for
infrastructure as part of OSBP, like a project promised to build a cross-border
bridge between Botswana and Zambia with a loan of up to JPY11.612 billion
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(approximately US$116 million) in 201275. In short, Japan complements
western donors by taking the initiative on projects that western donors are
hesitant about, and the latter virtually condones the former, even if Japan is a
kind of ‘heterodoxy’ within the DAC. 
On the other hand, as mentioned above, China’s approach is quite similar
with Japan’s. Although Tokyo should be an unwelcome opponent for Beijing in
terms of its comparative advantage, the former’s full-scale approach obscures
the latter’s individuality. In a complicated game named the New Scramble,
Japan being in the crevice between the West and China is a ‘wild card’ for the
both sides.
Summary and conclusion
We have seen the shift and individuality of Japan’s development cooperation
in the context of the New Scramble. In the race for ‘Africa’s friendship’, Japan
takes a distinctive role. Tokyo does not adhere to standardised poverty
reduction, but is quiet on the recipients’ internal affairs. However, the GOJ does
not forget to colour almost all projects, including huge infrastructures, with the
concept of human security, and to engage in African grassroots. One may say
that Japan chose the way which seldom causes friction with the recipients.
Yet it is hard for Japan to become an ace or a king in the game, the New
Scramble, because of its grey position. Unlike the West, Japan requires almost
nothing from the recipient governments, and does not coerce them into any
ideals. On the other hand, unlike Beijing, Tokyo is too westernised politically to
defend them from the West. In short, while Tokyo’s quietness is its advantage
to advance in Africa while avoiding trouble with the governments and their
people, it is a disadvantage to making a critical impact in the game.
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However, that does not mean that Japan has no role in the New Scramble.
Indeed Japan’s approach is not attractive enough to gain numerous supporters,
but it rarely makes oppositional relations not only with the recipients, but also
with the West. Besides Japan’s approach has a commonality not only with the
West, but also with China. Although its chameleonic feature is a limitation of
Japan as a power, it also means that most of its players can be easily associated
with it. Hence, one can safely state that players including Africa, who skilfully
makes use of the wild card, will take an advantage in the game. 
Rather, the grey position is an internal subject for the GOJ. According to
research conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization in 2012, 57.8% of
168 Japanese enterprises doing business on the continent, as the largest number
of respondents, answered “the most requisite support by the GOJ is to
communicate with the partner governments in order to make them pay attention
to requests by business76.” As mentioned above, it is critical to have a close
relationship with African governments in the New Scramble. On the other hand,
it is well known that inadequate institutions or illegal activities by public
servants make conducting business in Africa hard. Viewed in this light, indeed
the GOJ’s approach seldom causes friction with the recipient governments, but
it also means that it has little substantial influence to require them to improve
the business environment or governance. Moreover, unlike Southeast Asia in
the 1970s, Tokyo has few informal human networks with African governments.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the situation does not necessarily promote
the activities of Japanese enterprises. Therefore the GOJ’s current approach
toward Africa includes a reversal characteristic, and it can undermine its
ambition. In other words, as with other donors, it is time for Japan to reconsider
its approach toward Africa.
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